Abstract Infl uenza A virus is a potent pathogen of annual respiratory illness with huge potential of causing occasional pandemics of catastrophic consequences. In April 2009, a novel, swine-origin infl uenza A H1N1/09 virus was identifi ed in Mexico which continued to spread globally. This unique virus emerged from an avian, human, Eurasian swine viral strain and a North American swine strain belonging to the lineage of the 1930 swine virus. Till date H1N1/09 pandemic has been relatively mild and lacks the previously described molecular markers of infl uenza A pathogenicity and transmissibility. In this review, we will discuss the molecular and antigenic determinants of this virus and its designation as a low pathogenic strain, which carries the potential to develop into a devastating strain with subsequent mutations and reassortments.
Introduction
The more we share space the more we share disease. Appropriately nature takes it revenge to restore a balance among different species by introduction of communicable diseases and viruses. Viruses are the most mutable and rapidly evolving human parasites. They are the cleverest of the whole lot and have the capability to defy all rules of nature. These organisms are more intelligent than humans and display great intelligence and skills to survive and evolve at the same time. Therefore, it is not very surprising to see, in the present century, a number of zoonotic diseases re-emerge in different parts of the globe and also witness more pathogenic viral reassortants.
For past many decades infl uenza virus has caused pandemics at irregular intervals and has been successful in killing millions of humans globally and still threatens to continue its devastation. Recently, cases of a novel H1N1 infl uenza virus of fi rst human infection were identifi ed in April 2009 in California and soon thereafter in Texas and Mexico, killing as many as 100 people. Since then, the virus has spread throughout the globe across Europe, Asia, South America, Australia and has caused 4,735 deaths, impelling the World Health Organisation (WHO) to raise its pandemic alert level to Phase 6, widespread onset of an infl uenza pandemic. It is very essential to develop a global surveillance system for the early detection of a virus having a pandemic potential.
Biology and epidemiology of infl uenza virus
Infl uenza viruses are, extremely abominable but very agile and rapidly mutating. They form a unique group of viruses classifi ed into A, B and C types depending upon their matrix and nucleoprotein. Infl uenza A viruses, members of the Orthomyxoviridae family, genus infl uenza virus A, are an ingenious group of viruses endemic to wild aquatic birds, pigs, horses, ferrets and seals [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] . Infl uenza A virions contain 8 RNA genome segments of negative polarity encoding a total of 11 proteins. Enveloped virions are 80 to 120 nm in diameter, 200 to 300 nm long, and may be fi lamentous [13, 14] . They consist of spike-shaped surface proteins, a partially host-derived lipid-rich envelope, and matrix (M) proteins surrounding a helical segmented nucleocapsid. Mutations resulting from the error-prone replicative machinery of the virus (antigenic drift) and an ability to produce reassortants by the mixing of gene segments from two viruses (antigenic shift) in the event of a dual infection, both contribute to the self-sustenance of these viruses [15] . The infl uenza A virus can be further classifi ed on the basis of antigenically different surface glycoproteins HA and NA with 16 types of HA and 9 types of NA. The virus undergoes antigenic drift with progressive continual changes in the external glycoproteins to evade the innate immune system. The new pandemic strains of infl uenza that have emerged have used a similar mechanism of antigenic shift.
Initially it was thought that the infl uenza virus cannot break the interspecies barrier but the myth was cleared when the prototype strain of SIV was recovered in 1930, which was genetically and antigenically similar to the 1918 pandemic H1N1 virus [16] . Infl uenza viruses are endemic to wild aquatic birds, waterfowl and ducks, hence exposure to them gives more opportunities for the introduction of an infl uenza virus into a swine herd, which acts as the much needed carrier in nature to bridge the gap between the two specieshuman and avian. Pigs are considered to be a potential source for novel infl uenza viruses, because they are the mixing vessels having receptors on their tracheal epithelial cells for both mammalian and avian infl uenza viruses to bind, thus increasing the opportunity for the recombination of genetic segments in vivo among various strains of viruses [17, 18] .
Infl uenza in pigs was fi rst detected in 1930 and was considered of same lineage as 1918 human pandemic strain [16] . Termed as classical swine H1N1 virus it remained antigenically stable and continued to circulate in pigs of Asia and North American in 20th century and until 1980s in Europe, where it was later replaced by a novel avian origin swine H1N1 virus [19] . In Europe this avian-like swine H1N1 reassorted with human H3N2 to give rise to swine H3N2 and H1N2 separately. Until 1997 in North America swine infl uenza was almost exclusively of H1N1 lineage, then a new swine infl uenza virus subtype H3N2 appeared with gene segments acquired from human, swine and avian infl uenza viruses leading to an epidemic in immunologically naive pigs which were only immune to the H1N1 strain [20] .
Further reassortment between H3N2 and classical H1N1 resulted in the appearance of H1N2.
Swine infl uenza of subtypes H1N1, H1N2 and H3N2 has been variously reported as zoonosis in humans. In 1976, 13 cases of classical H1N1 swine infl uenza were observed in human with 1 death in USA. During 2005-2009, 11 human cases of triple reassortant swine H1N1 and H1N2 were recognized. In addition variants of human H3N2 have established in swine population where they show minimal drift, with this herd acting as a reservoir after these strains have disappeared from human population only to re-emerge later to infect humans.
Past infl uenza pandemics
The past century has witnessed around three devastating infl uenza pandemics and the most catastrophic of the three was the 1918 Spanish fl u pandemic which resulted in approximately 40 million deaths worldwide [21] [22] [23] . The 1918 H1N1 virus was undoubtedly the most unique, lethal and highly virulent till date. The origins of this infl uenza variant still remain elusive, because of the unavailability of techniques to isolate the virus. It was thought to have originated in China in a rare genetic shift of the virus. The sequence of the 1918 HA resembled closely to A/sw/ Iowa/30, the fi rst infl uenza virus isolated from swine [24] .
In 1957 a new Asian infl uenza pandemic virus emerged from the reassortment of the H1N1 virus and other infl uenza A virus which contained the HA, NA, and the gene for polymerase proteins (PB1) from an avian source, along with the remaining fi ve RNA gene segments from the human H1N1 infl uenza virus which killed approximately 1 million people. With time the H1N1 virus circulation decreased and halted in humans. In 1968 another reassortant appeared in the form of the Hong Kong pandemic strain H3N2 carrying the HA and PB2 gene segments from H3 avian isolate and the remaining gene segments from a H2N2 human virus [25] .
The Russian infl uenza outbreak in 1977 was benign and emerged from a H1N1 strain circulating in humans. The virus was restricted to immunologically naive individuals and caused an epidemic disease in children and adults below 25 years of age worldwide. The antigenic and molecular characterization of this H1N1 virus showed that HA and NA were remarkably similar to the H1N1 strain circulating in 1950s [26] . A nucleotide sequencing and phylogenetic analysis from samples obtained, identifi ed the virus to be H1N1 that was antigenically and genetically unrelated to human seasonal influenza isolates and genetically related to viruses known to circulate in swine [27] . Samples collected from Mexico and USA reveal that this novel strain of swine origin is a result of reassortment between closely circulating Eurasian Swine and North American triple reassortant swine H1N2 virus. The gene segments encoding the proteins NA and M are genetically similar to the Eurasian swine isolate which was reported to enter the Eurasian swine population through wild ducks in 1979 [28] . It has since been confi ned to Eurasia and never been reported in North America. The triple reassortant swine virus H3N2 fi rst reported in 1998 USA Evolutionary events of pandemic H1N1/2009 Fig. 1 The reassortment between the avian, classical swine and human infl uenza virus resulted in the emergence of the triple reassorted North American H3N2 and H1N2. This triple reassortment virus then further reassorted with Eurasian swine fl u lineage which lead to the emergence of the current pandamic H1N1 2009. swine population, was the result of reassortment between the North American human H3N2, the classical swine H1N1 virus and an unknown North American avian infl uenza isolate. A further reassortment of the 1998 isolate with the classical H1N1 swine resulted in North American swine H1N2 in 1999 [29, 30] (Fig. 1) . Thus, the gene segments NP, NS and HA are derived from the classical H1N1 swine virus, the PB1 gene from the human H3N2 virus and the PB2 and PA genes from the avian lineage which entered the swine population in 1998.
Swine fl u outbreak

Virus transmission
The pandemic H1N1 strain has acquired the ability to be transmitted human to human, even though the individual is not in direct contact with the infected swine. The virus has adapted itself in human population and the reassortments that had occurred in its genome have conferred effi cient replication, transmission and sustenance in humans. As mentioned earlier, pigs serve as a mixing vessel for such reassortment between various strains of infl uenza due to the presence of both avian and human receptors in its tracheal epithelium [31] . Human infl uenza viruses preferentially bind sialic acid linked α-2,6 galactose receptors whereas, avian infl uenza viruses bind sialic acid linked α-2,3 galactose receptors [32] . So, the direct transmission of avian viruses to humans is restricted, as the co-infection of both viruses in pigs, in the same cell, will lead to recombination of their genomic segments.
The H1N1/2009 isolate is not as transmissible as the 1918 H1N1 pandemic strain, but comparatively it is more transmissible than the seasonal infl uenza. The incubation time of the H1N1/2009 pandemic strain ranges between 2-7 days, which is longer than that of seasonal infl uenza A viruses (approx 1.4 days) [27] . Individuals in direct contact with infl uenza infected pigs are likely to contract infection. This strain is transmitted from infected to healthy individuals through dissemination of droplets (coughing/ sneezing), infected saliva, nasal secretion, fecal matter and blood [33, 34] . The symptoms of swine fl u in humans are similar to those of regular seasonal infl uenza and include fever, lethargy, lack of appetite and coughing. Some people with swine fl u also have reported running nose, sore throat, nausea, vomiting and diarrhea. Signs of a more serious swine fl u infection include pneumonia and respiratory failure. Individuals at high risk of getting affl icted are pregnant women, people with chronic medical problems, such as chronic lung disease, asthma, cardiovascular disease, diabetes, and immunosuppressed patients.
Viral pathogenicity
The pathogenesis of the virus is defi ned by its ability to enter and replicate within the host cell, its capability to combat host defense mechanisms and its ability to produce temporary or permanent damage. All these factors are determined by its genetic and antigenic composition. The host factors that decide the pathogenicity and virulence of a virus include the presence of target receptors on the host cells and availability of proteases in host cells which are essential for viral entry and replication.
Molecular characterization of infl uenza viral proteins
HA cleavage sequence
The hemagglutinin (HA) glycoprotein of infl uenza A viruses have two important functions that are required for the virus to be infectious. The HA protein is responsible for the attachment of a virus particle to the host cell and also the subsequent fusion of the host and viral membranes in the endosome for the introduction of viral genetic material into the cell. Cleavage of HA into HA1 and HA2 by host proteases [17] such as furin in the trans-golgi network is a prerequisite for viral infectivity. HA cleavability is determined by the amino acid sequence at the cleavage site. The cleavage site has a basic amino acid in 7 of the 8 positions (RERRRKKR) in the wild type infl uenza [35] [36] [37] (Table 1 ). The HA proteins of highly pathogenic H5 and H7 viruses and the HA of the 1918 infl uenza virus strain possess multiple basic amino acid residues at the HA1-HA2 cleavage site, which is eventually cleaved by ubiquitous cellular proteases. On the other hand, low pathogenic variants have a single Arg at the cleavage site which is only recognized by extracellular proteases secreted by cells in the respiratory and intestinal tract [38] . The low pathogenic strain can evolve into a highly pathogenic one if it acquires the necessary mutations at the cleavage site facilitating their processing and activation by the host proteases.
HA receptor specifi city
Changes from leucine to glutamine and a change from serine to glycine at position 226 and 228 respectively have been reported to be involved in determining binding specifi city to host cell receptors and changing the specifi city from avian to human cell receptors [39] [40] [41] . For H1 HAs, amino acids at position 190 and 225 determine receptorbinding specifi city. HA-Asp 190 and HA-Asp 225 confer binding to human type receptors, whereas HA-Glu 190 and HA-Gly 225 confer binding to avian-type receptors [42] . The recently emerged swine originated strain possesses the human type amino acid substitution at position 190 and 225, thus facilitating its adept transmission in humans.
NP, PB1 and PB2 as genetic determinants of high pathogenicity and virulence
There is an increasing evidence that the viral polymerase plays an important role in host adaptation. In a comparative study of the avian strain SC35 (H7N7) and its mouse-adapted variant SC35M it was shown that adaptation to mice was the result of seven mutations in the polymerase proteins, six of which (L13P and S678N in PB1, D701N and S714R in PB2, K615N in PA, and N319K in NP) were responsible for enhanced polymerase activity in mammalian cells [43] . In avian cells, replication and transcription of SC35M was reduced, whereas both activities were increased with SC35. PB2 mutation D701N has also been implicated in the adaptation of H5N1 viruses to mammalian hosts [44, 45] but other mutations notably PB2 mutation E627K has been found in most infl uenza viruses pathogenic to humans and also infl uences virulence in mice. It has been proved to be one of the host range determinants [46, 47] .
Therefore, viruses with Lys at position 627 in PB2 are more pathogenic in mice and those with Glu at the same position are less pathogenic. The recently emerged SOIVs possess Glu and Asp at position 627 and 701 (Table 1) thus classifying them as a low pathogenic strain however more comparative data on the other polymerase genes is not available.
PB1-F2: Pandemic protein
A recently identifi ed and characterized infl uenza virus protein called PB1-F2 encoded by the PB1 gene from the +1 reading frame is a potential virulence factor that could play a role in pathogenesis of pandemic infl uenza viruses [48] . The infl uenza virus PB1-F2 is a 90-amino acid protein that is associated with the induction of cell death. PB1-F2 has been implicated in the causation of severe symptoms and high death rate associated with the 1918 virus [49] . All classic swine sequences have a truncated PB1-F2 (in-frame stop codons after 11, 24 and 35) ( Table 1 ). Human H1N1 from 1918 through 1947 contains full-length PB1-F2, whereas human H1N1 beginning in 1956 has a truncated PB1-F2. The C-terminal domain of PB1-F2 contains the mitochondrial signal and can trigger apoptosis in specifi c cells. In a study, an infl uenza virus was engineered to express a version of PB1-F2 identical to that in the 1918 pandemic strain which was virulent in mice and led to more severe bacterial pneumonia, explaining the high virulence and high incidence of fatal pneumonia during the pandemic [50] . The above study suggested that the expression of fulllength PB1-F2 may contribute to disease severity in mice and humans.
Role of NS-1
The non-structural protein 1 (NS1) of infl uenza A virus is a potent antagonist of the cellular antiviral interferon (IFN) response [51, 52] . It is a multifunctional protein with two domains, a dsRNA binding domain (RBD) and an effector domain (ED) that interacts with various host cellular proteins. NS1 is shown to be a virulence determinant, especially in the highly pathogenic H5N1 viruses. Thus, the ability of NS1 to counteract interferon activity and RNA silencing suppression activity contribute to the virulence and pathogenicity of the virus.
The C-termini of highly pathogenic H5N1 viruses have a PDZ-binding motif that has been implicated in causing increased pathogenicity in mice [53] . The SOIVs lack the 11 C-terminal amino acids of NS1, and hence lack the PDZ domain motif therefore making this strain a low pathogenic one ( Table 1) .
The molecular and functional analysis of virulence determinants can be utilized for the development of molecular-based vaccines. Amid fears of a second wave of this potentially lethal virus, many countries have developed vaccines which would be administered to people at the most effective and safest dose to generate a strong immune response to the 2009 pandemic strain.
Conclusion
Ever since 1918, this tenacious virus has developed tricks to survive in one form or another. The virus evolves in a harmless reservoir making it hard to predict how and when it will exploit its gene pool to re-emerge. The possibility of re-assortment of this virus with seasonal infl uenza viruses and more importantly with avian (H5N1) viruses is a serious concern.
So far the virus is not that dangerous. However, it cannot be predicted whether it will stay mild or become serious. It is known that the 1918 virus was relatively mild in its fi rst wave and it had acquired virulence when it came back in the second wave in winters.
The currently circulating H1N1 virus is a new strain of the fl u virus, and because the human population has no immunity to it the potential to causing harm is greater. Unlike the various strains of animal fl u that have emerged in the past, the latest pandemic strain is capable of spreading from human to human. The impact of any pandemic would vary in different countries, as it is mild in countries with developed health facilities but may be devastating in developing 
